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Social scientists have long observed that how satisfied people are 
with their “lot in life” is largely determined by relative (e.g., what they 
have compared with what others around them have) rather than 
absolute standards of affluence (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Davis, 1959; 
Duesenberry, 1949; Runciman, 1966; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, 
Star, & Williams, 1949). In a systematic review of these effects, 
Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, and Bialosiewicz (2012) emphasized the 
importance of personal relative deprivation, which they characterized 
as a process beginning with an appraisal of one’s relative disadvan-
tage leading to perceptions of unfairness that, in turn, give rise to 
feelings of anger, resentment, and dissatisfaction. Personal relative 
deprivation is associated with a variety of social outcomes, attitudes, 
and behaviors (Crosby, 1976; Mark & Folger, 1984; Walker & Smith, 
2002). Indeed, since Smith et al.’s review, there has been burgeon-
ing interest in the consequences of feeling relatively deprived, with 
experimental and correlational research finding that people higher 
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Abstract
Drawing on social comparison and equity theories, we investigated the role that per-
ceived similarity of a comparison target plays in how resentful people feel about their 
relative financial status. In Study 1, participants tended to choose a comparison tar-
get who was better off, and they selected a target they perceived to be more similar 
than dissimilar along dimensions that surrounded their financial outcomes. In Study 
1, perceived relative disadvantage was positively associated with resentment regard-
less of the perceived similarity of the comparison target. The results of Studies 2 to 
5b clarified these findings by showing that being both similar and dissimilar to a tar-
get can cause resentment depending on the context. Using hypothetical and real 
social comparisons, we found that people are more dissatisfied with their financial 
outcomes when their comparative targets have the same background qualifications 
(i.e., are similar) but are financially better off (Studies 2, 3b, 4, and 5b). However, we 
also found that when the comparative financial contexts were similar (i.e., equal af-
fluence), participants were more dissatisfied when their target for comparison had 
lower qualifications (i.e., was dissimilar; Studies 2, 3a, 4, and 5a). In all cases, percep-
tions of unfairness mediated the effects of social comparison on financial dissatisfac-
tion. Taken together, these studies address some of the ambiguities around what it 
means to be similar to a target in the context of social comparisons of affluence, and 
they underscore the importance of perceived unfairness in the link between social 
comparison and resentment with one’s financial status.
K E Y W O R D S
equity, organizational justice, perceived similarity, perceived unfairness, personal relative 
deprivation, social comparison
This	is	an	open	access	article	under	the	terms	of	the	Creative	Commons	Attribution	License,	which	permits	use,	distribution	and	reproduction	in	any	medium,	
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2018 University of Vienna. Journal of Applied Social Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
2  |     KIM et al.
in personal relative deprivation tend to, for example, have greater 
problem gambling tendencies (Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2015; Mishra 
& Meadows, 2018), prefer smaller–sooner over larger–later rewards 
(Mishra	&	Novakowski,	2016;	Tabri,	Shead,	&	Wohl,	2017),	be	more	
materialistic (Kim, Callan, Gheorghiu & Matthews, 2017; Zhang, Tian, 
Lei, Yu, & Liu, 2015), have worse mental and physical health (Beshai, 
Mishra, Mishra, & Carleton, 2017; Callan, Kim, & Matthews, 2015), be 
more interpersonally hostile (Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2017), and be 
less willing to act for the benefit of others (Callan, Kim, Gheorghiu, & 
Matthews, 2017; Zhang, Liu, & Tian, 2016).
Although	 there	 has	 been	 a	 resurgence	 of	 interest	 in	 the	 vari-
ous consequences of feeling relatively deprived, much less recent 
research has examined the antecedents of personal relative depri-
vation, particularly in terms of the social comparison processes in-
volved. To experience the sense of unfairness and resentment that 
characterizes personal relative deprivation, a person must make a 
comparison and decide that she does not have what she “should” 
have (Crosby, 1976). Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory em-
phasizes the importance to this process of the perceived similarity 
between oneself and the comparison target, presumably because 
comparing with similar others provides the most relevant and diag-
nostic information for selfevaluation. Several studies have supported 
the idea that people prefer to compare with others who are similar 
on attributes or dimensions that surround the dimension under evalu-
ation, even if those surrounding dimensions are seemingly irrelevant 
(for reviews, see Suls & Wheeler, 2017; Wood, 1989). For example, 
Miller (1982) found that participants chose to compare their per-
formance on a logical reasoning test with others who were similar 
in physical attractiveness. Similarly, Suls, Gaes, and Gastorf (1979) 
found that participants tended to choose same‐sex targets for com-
parison when evaluating their performance on a mental ability test.
To date most research examining the role of similarity in the se-
lection of comparison targets has involved asking participants to com-
plete measures of intellectual ability in laboratory contexts (for further 
examples, see Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982; Zanna, Goethals, & 
Hill, 1975). But does “similarity” matter to people when it comes to 
their social comparisons of actual financial circumstances? The motiva-
tion of the current research was to explore several issues related to the 
role of perceived similarity in the experience of personal relative depri-
vation. Specifically, our goals were (1) to test whether people tend to 
make social comparisons of affluence with targets they perceive to be 
similar along surrounding dimensions, (2) to determine whether people 
tend to select targets for comparison who are financially better‐off 
or worse‐off, (3) to examine the effect of perceived similarity on the 
experience of personal relative deprivation, (4) test the mediating role 
of perceived unfairness in the effect of adverse social comparisons on 
resentment, and (5) to address some of the ambiguities around what it 
means to be “similar” or “dissimilar” to a comparison target.
To address our first three goals, In Study 1 we asked participants to 
think of an individual whose material and financial circumstances they 
usually compare with their own, and to rate their perceived similarity 
to the comparison individual. To the extent that people select similar 
versus dissimilar others in their social comparisons of affluence, we 
expected participants to rate their comparative target as more similar 
than dissimilar. The extant social comparison literature also suggests 
that, for a given evaluative dimension, people often select (at least 
slightly) better performing targets for comparison, presumably to self‐
improve, but they may also make downward social comparisons, pre-
sumably to self‐enhance (see Collins, 2000; Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 
2002; Suls & Wheeler, 2017; Wood, 1989, for discussions of the factors 
that	determine	comparison	direction).	Again,	this	work	has	typically	in-
volved comparisons of intellectual abilities or task performance as the 
evaluative dimensions and not comparisons of affluence. However, re-
search investigating social comparison direction in workplace contexts 
suggests the possibility that people might make more upward than 
downward social comparisons of their financial outcomes (e.g., Brown, 
Ferris, Heller, & Keeping, 2007; Buunk, Zurriaga, Gonzalez‐Roma, & 
Subirats, 2003; Michinov, 2005). For example, Brown et al. found that 
participants self‐reported comparing themselves more frequently with 
co‐workers who were better‐off than coworkers who were worse‐off. 
These studies, however, used measures that included items assessing 
comparisons along the surrounding dimensions (e.g., quality of super-
vision, working conditions) along with comparisons of financial status 
(e.g., salary), so whether people tend to make upward comparisons spe-
cifically of their financial outcomes is unclear. Similarly, Boyce, Brown, 
and Moore (2010) found that the effect of relative income on life sat-
isfaction was better accounted for by a regression model in which up-
ward comparisons were weighted more heavily than downward ones, 
but this work did not directly test whether people actually make such 
comparisons. Thus, in Study 1, we asked participants to rate the degree 
to which their target for comparison was better‐off financially than 
themselves (dimension under evaluation) separately from their rating 
of target similarity (surrounding dimensions).
Separately gauging the perceived similarity and the comparative 
financial status of a target individual also allowed us to test whether 
personal relative deprivation arises most strongly when people are 
disadvantaged relative to similar than dissimilar others. That is, based 
on Festinger’s (1954) similarity hypothesis, we explored whether the 
positive relationship between perceived relative disadvantage and re-
sentment with one’s relative financial status would be stronger among 
individuals who compare with others whom they perceive to be more 
similar than dissimilar in terms of their surrounding dimensions.
Drawing	 on	 equity	 theory	 (Adams,	 1965;	 Austin,	 McGinn,	 &	
Susmilch, 1980; Crosby & Gonzalez‐Intal, 1984), in our remaining 
studies we addressed some of the ambiguities around what it means 
to be “similar” or “dissimilar” to a comparison target in the context 
of social comparisons of affluence. Equity theory posits that peo-
ple determine the fairness of their outcomes by comparing the ratio 
between their outcomes (e.g., income, possessions) and inputs (e.g., 
qualifications, skills) with the corresponding ratios of referent others. 
By this formulation, one could feel dissatisfied with their own salary 
if, for example, a coworker has the same salary as them but is less 
qualified or if a coworker has a higher salary than them but holds 
the same qualifications (i.e., “dissimilar” or “similar,” respectively, 
along the surrounding dimension of qualifications). Thus, whether 
one feels resentful about being financially worse off compared to 
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a referent other might depend on the particular ways in which the 
target is similar or not similar.
Using hypothetical (Studies 2–3b) and real (Studies 4–5b) social 
comparison situations, we examined the potential interactive effect 
of similarity and perceived relative disadvantage on resentment and 
dissatisfaction by manipulating both the evaluative (i.e., affluence) and 
surrounding	 (i.e.,	 qualifications)	 comparative	dimensions.	As	Crosby	
(1976) noted, “by definition, the sense of injustice is a part of relative 
deprivation” (p. 91). Feather (2015) similarly noted that “resentment 
… is assumed to occur when another person’s positive outcome is 
perceived to be undeserved and when the self’s negative outcome 
is perceived to be undeserved” (p. 12). But recently researchers have 
often neglected to directly assess the role that perceptions of justice 
and fairness play in the experience of personal relative deprivation. 
Motivated by the observation that societal income inequality has been 
rising in the industrial world over the last few decades (Piketty & Saez, 
2014; Solt, 2016), researchers have also primarily focused their efforts 
on the negative consequences of income inequality for the individual 
(e.g., Buttrick & Oishi, 2017; Callan, Ellard, Shead, & Hodgins, 2008; 
Canale et al., 2017; Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2017; Payne, Brown‐
Iannuzzi,	&	Hannay,	2017,	Smith	&	Hou,	2014).	As	noted	above,	how-
ever, equity theory suggests that people may feel resentful even if 
their comparative target is just as well off financially as them (i.e., 
under conditions of income equality) insofar as they perceive that they 
are getting less than they deserve given their relative “inputs.” What 
potentially matters for the experience of personal relative depriva-
tion, then, is the perceived unfairness of one’s relative standing rather 
than the equality of outcomes per se. Thus, in Studies 3a to 5b we 
assessed participants’ sense of unfairness along with resentment and 
dissatisfaction to test the mediating role that perceived unfairness 
plays in the effect of adverse social comparisons on resentment.
1  | SAMPLING
We	recruited	participants	through	Amazon’s	Mechanical	Turk	for	all	
studies.	Across	studies,	the	minimum	required	sample	sizes	were	fixed	
ahead of data collection; however, the final sample sizes were not 
completely predetermined due to slight over‐recruitment and the re-
moval of some participants (e.g., for failing attention check questions; 
see below). Sensitivity power analyses showed that our samples had 
at least 80% power to detect “medium” effect sizes (e.g., d = 0.55 for 
the between‐subjects t‐tests in Studies 3a and 3b and dz = 0.32 for the 
within‐subjects t‐tests in Studies 5a and 5b; two‐tailed, α = 0.05). We 
report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in these studies.
2  | STUDY 1
2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Participants
For Study 1, we recruited 413 participants (63% male; Mage = 33.65, 
SDage	=	10.26)	 to	 complete	 an	 online	 survey.	 An	 additional	 202	
participants were not included in analyses due to duplicate IP ad-
dresses (n	=	18),	 failing	 a	 basic	 attention	 check	 item	 (“Attention	
check, please select the ‘strongly disagree option’”; n = 29), or not 
following the instructions (n = 155; see below).
2.1.2 | Procedure and measures
Social comparison
In an online survey, we first asked participants to think of one indi-
vidual with whom they usually compare themselves in terms of their 
financial circumstances, as follows:
At	one	time	or	another,	most	of	us	compare	our	mate-
rial and financial situation with that of other people. 
We’d like you to think of one individual who you might 
usually compare yourself with in terms of your cur-
rent material and financial circumstances.
Who is the first person that comes to mind? This indi-
vidual can be anyone you like.
We asked participants to enter the initials of the person they identi-
fied (e.g., WS) in a text box.
Perceived similarity
On the next page of the survey, we asked participants to “think 
about how dissimilar or similar you are to this individual in terms 
of any dimensions, characteristics, or attributes other than your 
current material and financial situation.” They rated how dissimi-
lar‐to‐similar they considered this individual to be to themselves 
(“In your own view, how dissimilar or similar are you to this indi-
vidual?”) using an 11‐point	slider	scale	(−5	=	Extremely dissimilar to 
me, +5 = Extremely similar to me). The target’s initials were “piped” 
into the slider scale (e.g., “WS is:”) using Qualtrics online survey 
software.
Similarity dimensions
On the subsequent page of the survey, participants then indicated 
using a text box what characteristics came to mind for them when 
they determined their rating of how dissimilar‐to‐similar they were 
to the individual they identified: “What dimensions, characteristics, 
or attributes of [initials] came to mind for you when you were deter-
mining your rating of how dissimilar to similar s/he is to you?”, where 
[initials] were the initials of the comparison target entered by the 
participant in the first part of the survey.
Comparison direction
On a new page, using a slider scale, participants rated the degree to 
which the individual they identified earlier in the survey was bet-
ter off or worse off than them in terms of their current material 
and	 financial	 situation	(−5	=	Extremely worse off than me financially, 
+5 = Extremely better off than me financially). The target’s initials 
were again “piped” into the slider scale (e.g., “WS is:”).
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Personal Relative Deprivation Scale (PRDS)
We used a modified version of Callan, Shead and Olson’s (2011) 5‐
item PRDS to measure how deprived participants felt compared to 
the individual they identified earlier in the survey. The PRDS has 
acceptable test–retest and internal reliability (Callan et al., 2015), 
and has been shown to be associated with theoretically relevant 
antecedents and consequences of higher personal relative dep-
rivation, such as greater social comparison proclivity (Callan, Kim, 
& Matthews, 2015) and increased delay discounting (Callan et al., 
2011). For this study, we programmed the items to be specifically 
about participants’ comparative target rather than “other people” in 
general as for the original scale (e.g., “I feel deprived when I think 
about what I have compared to what [initials] has”). The five items 
were averaged to form a composite measure (α = 0.73), with higher 
scores indicating greater personal relative deprivation.
Finally, participants indicated their annual household income 
given eight categories (less than $15,000, $15,001–$25,000, $25,001–
$35,000, $35,001–$50,000, $50,001–$75,000, $75,001–$100,000, 
$100,001–$150,000, and greater than $150,000), their current access 
to money using an open‐ended text box (“how much money in dol-
lars do you have access to that you could use or spend in whatever 
way you pleased?”), and their age and gender.1
2.2 | Results
2.2.1 | Content analysis of responses for 
similarity dimensions
A	content	analysis	 revealed	 that	participants	considered	personal-
ity (29%; e.g., “we’re both introverted, soft‐spoken”), jobs/career 
(21%; “we work in the same office”), age (22%; “we are around the 
same age”), and interests (22%; “our interests overlap a lot”) as the 
most frequently mentioned surrounding dimensions for selection of 
comparison individuals. Participants often mentioned several com-
parison dimensions at once (e.g., “Our age, appearance, background, 
education, work, personal interests”), and the dimensions ranged 
broadly	 from	 hair	 color	 to	 religious	 beliefs.	 Although	 we	 specifi-
cally instructed participants not to make comparisons based on their 
current material and financial circumstances, a substantial number 
of participants (N = 155, 27%) mentioned income, material posses-
sions, or financial situation as one of their comparison dimensions. 
Given our focus on the surrounding dimensions for comparison, these 
participants were not included in subsequent analyses, but analyses 
including these participants resulted in the same conclusions.
2.2.2 | Perceived similarity and 
comparison direction
A	one	sample	t‐test revealed that participants on average chose in-
dividuals who were similar to themselves (M = 1.62, SD = 2.46, com-
pared against the scale mid‐point of 0), t(412) = 13.36, p < 0.001. 
Overall, a large majority of participants compared themselves with 
an individual whom they perceived to be like themselves (79% of the 
participants responded above the scale mid‐point of 0). Likewise, a 
one sample t‐test revealed that participants on average rated their 
chosen target as financially better off than themselves (M = 1.81, 
SD = 2.07, compared against the scale mid‐point of 0), t(412) = 17.73, 
p < 0.001. Most participants compared themselves with an individ-
ual whom they perceived to be better off financially than themselves 
(74% responded above the scale mid‐point).
2.2.3 | Perceived similarity as a moderator of the 
relation between comparison direction and PRD
Descriptive statistics and zero‐order correlations among the meas-
ures are shown in Table 1.
We regressed personal relative deprivation onto social compari-
son direction (standardized), perceived similarity (standardized), and 
their cross‐product interaction term. To control for participants’ ab-
solute wealth and access to money, we included annual household 
income and current access to money to spend as predictors. Here and 
throughout, we coded annual household income responses using the 
category mid‐points, with the value for the open‐ended highest cat-
egory being the median‐based Pareto curve estimator described by 
Parker and Fenwick (1983; see Matthews, Gheorghiu, & Callan, 2016). 
The measures of household income and access to money to spend 
were log transformed to improve normality and then standardized.
The moderated regression analysis revealed that access to money to 
spend, b	=	−0.11,	SEb = 0.043, t(407)	=	−2.41,	p = 0.016, but not house-
hold income, b	 =	−0.01,	SEb = 0.043, p = 0.84, accounted for unique 
variability in personal relative deprivation. More importantly, social 
1	Although	we	did	not	originally	plan	to	do	so,	two	reviewers	asked	that	we	test	for	gender	
effects. Exploratory analyses revealed no statistically significant main or interaction effects 
involving participant gender for any of our dependent measures across our studies.
TA B L E  1   Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for measures used in Study 1
Measures M (SD) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Perceived similarity 1.62 (2.46) –
2. Target is better off 1.81 (2.07) ‒0.001 –
3. Income ($) 53,900 (39,312) 0.11* ‒0.18** –
4.	Afford	to	spend	($) 28,362 (269,279) 0.07 ‒0.25** 0.43** –
5. PRD 3.38 (0.96) ‒0.05 0.58** ‒0.16** ‒0.25** –
Note. PRD = Personal Relative Deprivation. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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comparison direction significantly predicted personal relative depriva-
tion, b = 0.54, SEb = 0.041, t(407) = 13.19, p < 0.001, such that perceiv-
ing a target as better off financially was associated with higher personal 
relative	deprivation	 (cf.	Kim	et	 al.,	 2017).	Neither	 the	main	 effect	 of	
perceived similarity, b	=	−0.05,	SEb = 0.039, t(407) = 1.21, p = 0.23, nor 
the perceived similarity × comparison direction interaction, b = 0.04, 
SEb = 0.034, t(407) = 1.22, p = 0.22, achieved statistical significance.
3  | STUDY 2
In Study 1, participants on average identified a social comparison tar-
get whom they perceived as more similar than dissimilar. This finding is 
broadly consistent with previous social comparison research in other 
contexts (Suls & Wheeler, 2017), and underscores the importance peo-
ple place on relatively local rather than general comparisons (Zell & 
Alicke,	2010).	We	also	found	that	participants	tended	to	select	compar-
ison targets who were financially better off, and this perceived relative 
disadvantaged correlated positively with personal relative deprivation.
Contrary to our expectations, perceived similarity of the target to 
the self did not significantly modulate the relationship between per-
ceived	relative	disadvantage	and	personal	relative	deprivation.	Although	
perceived similarity may, in fact, have little to do with the link between 
perceived relative disadvantage and resentment, it is notable that a large 
majority of our participants identified a target whom they perceived to 
be similar, at least compared against the mid‐point of the scale. This 
range restriction may have dampened the potential for perceived simi-
larity to moderate the effects of comparison direction, because we had 
relatively few participants identify a target who was dissimilar.
Another	issue	with	Study	1	is	the	ambiguity	around	what	it	means	to	
be “similar” or “dissimilar” to a comparison target on attributes that sur-
round the dimension under evaluation (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Wood, 
1989). Based on Festinger’s (1954) similarity hypothesis, we assumed 
that people would be less concerned about a highly dissimilar target 
being financially better off, but as we noted above there are likely situa-
tions where comparisons with dissimilar others may nonetheless cause 
resentment. For example, learning that a co‐worker has a higher—or 
even the same—salary as you but is less qualified (e.g., less skilled, not 
as experienced) may invoke resentment. On the other hand, a person 
might feel sanguine about their relative financial disadvantage if their 
comparative target is more highly qualified. In both of these examples, 
the comparative target is “dissimilar” (worse or better qualified), but 
dissimilar in ways that make the perceiver feel more or less resentful.
What these examples highlight is the importance of perceived 
equity or merit, rather than “similarity” per se, in people’s appraisals 
of the appropriateness of their outcomes. Thus, although Study 1 re-
vealed important evidence that people typically make upward com-
parisons of affluence and compare with similar others, the potential 
moderating role of “similarity” in the link between relative disadvan-
tage and resentment is not so straightforward, because comparisons 
with similar and dissimilar others can both lead to resentment if one’s 
outcomes‐to‐inputs ratio does not match the corresponding out-
comes‐to‐inputs ratio of one’s comparative target.
In Study 2, we examined whether the effect of perceived relative 
disadvantage on satisfaction with one’s financial outcomes depends 
on the relative qualifications (i.e., “inputs”) of the comparative target. 
To do so, we adopted an experimental approach where we factori-
ally varied cues within a hypothetical workplace scenario such that 
the targets for comparison were worse, similarly, or better qualified 
(cf. Olson, 1986) and financially worse‐off, similar to, or better‐off 
(cf.	van	den	Bos,	van	Veldhuizen,	&	Au,	2015)	than	the	participants.	
For each of these 9 comparison scenarios, we assessed the degree 
to which participants believed they would be dissatisfied with their 
outcome compared to the target’s outcome.
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants
We recruited 88 participants (61 males; Mage = 30.89, SDage = 7.41) 
to	complete	an	online	study.	An	additional	13	participants	were	ex-
cluded due to duplicate IP addresses (n = 3) or incorrectly answering 
one of two attention check items (n = 10; “Based on the scenario we 
provided, what is your position in the company?” and “Based on the 
scenario we provided, what degree did you earn?”).
3.1.2 | Procedure and measures
Participants	first	reported	their	age	and	gender.	Next,	for	a	“work-
place context” study, we asked participants to respond to a simulated 
workplace scenario as though they were really experiencing the event 
described. Participants read:
Imagine that you are a Senior Sales Executive with a 
competitive salary at a large management consultancy 
firm. You earned your Master’s degree in Economics. 
Soon after completing your master’s degree, you re-
ceived an offer for your current position. You have 
been working in the company for the last 3 years. You 
plan to stay with company [sic] for a while, and you 
have developed a good working relationship with the 
clients you have brought to the firm since you started.
Next,	 participants	were	 reminded	 of	 their	 current	 qualifications	
(i.e., position, degree, and the number of years of experience) before 
reading:
One day, you received an email from someone in 
Human Resources that, after opening it, you realized 
wasn’t meant for you. In the email was a list of sala-
ries for many of the employees at your company. You 
couldn’t help to notice that the salaries for several of 
your departmental co‐workers were listed in the email.
One at a time, we then provided participants with descriptions of 
nine different coworkers who were listed in the email. We varied the 
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comparative salary and background qualifications of the co‐workers in 
a fully within 3 (qualifications: lower, similar, higher) × 3 (salary: worse, 
similar, better) design. The lower qualifications condition involved a 
person who just started working for the company as a Junior Sales 
Executive, had an undergraduate degree in Economics, and had a 
smaller client base. The higher qualifications condition involved a per-
son who had worked for the company for 6 years, was a Chief Sales 
Executive, held a PhD in Economics, and had an extensive client base. 
The qualifications were matched in the similar qualifications condition 
(senior sales executive, master’s degree, working for 3 years). We var-
ied comparative salary by telling participants that the target individuals 
made $10,000 more, $10,000 less, or had the same salary as them.
All	descriptions	were	gender‐matched to the participants’ self‐
reported gender, such that female participants were presented with 
all female co‐workers and male participants with all male co‐work-
ers. For example, for the condition where the co‐worker who was 
better qualified yet had a lower salary, self‐identified female par-
ticipants read: “Jennifer is your co‐worker who has been working 
for the company for 6 years. She has a PhD in Economics and was 
recently promoted to Chief Sales Executive. She has developed an 
extensive client base for the company. In the email, you noticed 
that Jennifer makes $10,000 less than you per year.”
Participants rated the extent to which they felt dissatisfied‐to‐
satisfied with their salary compared to each of the target coworker’s 
salaries	(−4	=	Extremely dissatisfied to +4 = Extremely satisfied) imme-
diately after each description. To be consistent with Study 1, these 
ratings were rescaled so that higher values indicate higher levels of 
dissatisfaction. Participants completed nine questions in total, one 
for each of the comparison targets, which were presented in a ran-
dom order across participants.
3.2 | Results
A	3	 (qualifications:	 lower,	 similar,	higher)	×	3	 (comparative	salary:	
worse, similar, better) fully within‐subjects	ANOVA	revealed	signif-
icant main effects of comparative salary, F(1.72, 149.95) = 175.34, 
p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.67, and qualifications of the comparative targets, 
F(1.38, 120.20) = 184.74, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.68, on perceived dis-
satisfaction (degrees of freedom were Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rected). There was also a significant qualifications × comparative 
salary interaction, F(2.77, 240.68) = 33.28, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
	=	0.28.	As	
shown in Figure 1, the effect of comparative salary on participants’ 
dissatisfaction was weaker when the target was better qualified, 
F(1.54, 133.80) = 28.86, p < .001, 휂2
p
 = 0.25, than similarly quali-
fied, F(1.93, 167.93) = 143.61, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.62, or had lower 
qualifications, F(1.93, 168.03) = 135.50, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.61, than 
the participants. Of note, when qualifications were equal, partici-
pants were more dissatisfied when the target’s salary was higher 
(M = 1.90, SD = 1.32) than the participant’s than when it was the 
same as the participant’s (M	 =	 −1.11,	 SD = 1.42), t(87) = 14.62, 
p < 0.001, dz = 1.56. When the salaries were equal, participants 
were more dissatisfied when the target had lower qualifications 
(M = 1.89, SD = 1.81) than the same qualifications (M	 =	 −1.11,	
SD = 1.42), t(87) = 13.09, p < 0.001, dz = 1.40. When qualifications 
were the same, participants reported more dissatisfaction when 
the target had the same salary (M	=	−1.11,	SD = 1.42) vs. a worse 
salary (M	 =	 −1.63,	 SD = 1.52), t(87) = 2.29, p = 0.024, dz = 0.24. 
When the salaries were equal, there was no significant differences 
in dissatisfaction between the similar (M	 =	 −1.11,	 SD = 1.42) and 
higher (M	=	−1.42,	SD = 1.84) target qualifications conditions, t(87) 
= 1.44, p = 0.154, dz = 0.15.
F I G U R E  1   Participants’ mean perceived dissatisfaction after making upward, lateral, and downward comparisons with targets who were 
either better, similarly or worse qualified than the participant in Study 2. ns = not statistically significant. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
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4  | STUDIES 3A AND 3B
In Study 2, the effect of comparative financial status on participants’ 
dissatisfaction depended on the qualifications of the comparative 
targets. In Studies 3a and 3b, we examined in more detail the medi-
ating role that perceived unfairness plays in the effect of compara-
tive financial status on resentment. Using between‐subjects designs, 
Studies 3a and 3b examined the role of perceived unfairness in two 
of the comparative contexts from Study 2: when the self and other 
had the same salary (income equality) but the target had lower or 
worse qualifications (Study 3a), and when the self and other had the 
same qualifications but the target had a higher salary (income in-
equality) (Study 3b). We expected that the reason why both income 
equality and income inequality might produce personal relative dep-
rivation is because both of these contexts may be perceived as un-
fair given the surrounding attributes or “inputs” of the comparative 
targets (i.e., their qualifications).
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants
Participants were recruited to complete an online survey (Study 3a: 
N = 105, 64 males, Mage = 37.41, SDage = 12.37; Study 3b: N = 107; 
70 males; Mage = 36.29, SDage = 11.34). In Study 3a, an additional 
eight participants were excluded due to duplicate IP addresses 
(n = 3) or failing one or both attention check items (n = 5; per Study 
2). In Study 3b, an additional two participants were excluded for fail-
ing one or both attention check items, which were the same as for 
Study 2.
4.1.2 | Procedure and measures
The procedures for both Study 3a and 3b were similar to Study 2. 
The key difference was that we presented participants with only one 
of two targets for comparison (Michael or Sara for male or female 
participants, respectively). Specifically, in Study 3a, we fixed the 
comparative salary between conditions (i.e., the target earned the 
same salary as the participant) but varied between‐subjects whether 
the target held the same or worse qualifications than the participant. 
In Study 3b, we fixed the target’s qualifications between conditions 
(i.e., the target had the same qualifications as the participant) but 
varied between‐subjects whether the target received the same or a 
higher salary than the participant.
Perceived unfairness and income satisfaction
Participants responded to the same measures across Studies 
3a and 3b. Using two items, participants rated the degree to 
which they believed their comparative financial situation was 
less than they deserved: “I think it’s unfair how much [Michael 
or Sara] makes per year compared to what I make” and “When 
I think about my salary compared to [Michael or Sara]’s salary, I 
feel like I am getting less than I deserve.” Both items were rated 
on a 6‐point scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 6 = Strongly agree) and 
averaged to form a composite measure of perceived unfairness 
(rs between items for Studies 3a and 3b = 0.97 and 0.84, respec-
tively, ps < 0.001).
Dissatisfaction
We used two items to measure salary dissatisfaction: “I feel dissatis-
fied with my salary compared to [Michael or Sara]’s salary” and “I 
feel resentful when I think about my salary compared to [Michael 
or Sara]’s salary” (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree). Ratings 
were averaged to form a composite measure of dissatisfaction (rs 
between items for Studies 3a and 3b = 0.91 and 0.92, respectively, 
ps < 0.001).
4.2 | Results and discussion
4.2.1 | Study 3a
As	shown	in	Table	2,	participants	who	compared	themselves	with	a	
“co‐worker” with worse qualifications but who received an equal sal-
ary rated their current salary as being more unfair and felt more dis-
satisfied than those who compared themselves to a coworker with 
the same salary and qualifications.
Perceived unfairness and dissatisfaction were highly correlated (r 
= 0.96, p	<	0.001).	According	to	Smith	et	al.’s	(2012)	model	(cf.	Feather,	
2015), the experience of PRD stems from a process whereby a per-
son makes an adverse social comparison, believes themselves to be 
unfairly disadvantaged, and consequently feels resentful. We there-
fore tested the indirect effect of comparative qualifications on dis-
satisfaction through perceived unfairness using the quasi‐Bayesian 
Monte Carlo method (5,000 simulations) with the “mediation” package 
(Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014; see Imai, Keele, & 
Tingley,	2010)	in	R	(R	Core	Team,	2014).	As	shown	in	Figure	2	(upper	
panel), perceived unfairness significantly mediated the effect of com-
parative qualifications on dissatisfaction (indirect effect = 3.48, 95% 
Monte Carlo confidence interval [CI]: 2.94, 4.05; p	<	0.001).	Although	
this mediation pattern is consistent with Smith et al.’s model and past 
research (Callan et al., 2008), the results should be viewed with cau-
tion given the high correlation between perceived unfairness and 
resentment.
4.2.2 | Study 3b
As	 shown	 in	 Table	 2,	 participants	 who	 compared	 themselves	
with a “co‐worker” with similar qualifications but a higher salary 
rated their salary as more unfair and felt more dissatisfied than 
those who compared themselves to a coworker holding similar 
qualifications and receiving the same salary. Like Study 3a, per-
ceived unfairness and dissatisfaction were highly correlated (r = 
0.94, p	<	0.001).	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 2	 (lower	 panel),	 perceived	
unfairness significantly mediated the effect of comparative sal-
ary on dissatisfaction (indirect effect = 1.20, 95% CI: 0.97, 1.45, 
p < 0.001).
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5  | STUDY 4
Across	Studies	2,	3a,	and	3b,	we	found	consistent	evidence	that	
whether people feel dissatisfied with their financial outcomes de-
pends on the background or surrounding attributes of the referent 
others, and this dissatisfaction correlates highly with perceived 
unfairness. One major limitation of these studies, however, is the 
hypothetical	nature	of	the	workplace	scenario	we	used.	Although	
these studies shed light on how norms of equity underpin personal 
relative deprivation, it was unclear whether we would observe 
similar patterns when people were asked to make real social com-
parisons of their actual financial circumstances. To this end, we 
aimed to conceptually replicate our findings from Studies 2 to 3b 
by adapting our procedure from Study 1. Specifically, in Study 4, 
we asked participants to think of actual comparative targets that 
varied in terms of their relative financial circumstances (better 
off, similarly off, or worse off) and their background qualifications 
(lower, similar, higher).
5.1 | Method
5.1.1 | Participants
Participants were recruited to complete an online survey (N = 116; 
63 males; Mage = 35.11, SDage = 10.15; Mincome = $48,027, SDincome = 
$31,464;	60%	at	least	college	graduation).	An	additional	two	partici-
pants were excluded due to duplicate IP addresses.
5.1.2 | Procedure and measures
Using a fully within‐subjects 3 (qualifications) × 3 (financial situation) 
design, we asked participants to think of nine comparison targets 
across varying levels of the target’s qualifications (lower, similar, 
higher) and comparative financial situation (worse off, similar, better 
off). Participants identified and responded to their chosen compara-
tive targets one at a time, with presentation order randomized for 
each participant. For example, in the similar qualifications/finan-
cially better off condition, participants read:
In this question, we’d like you to think of one indi-
vidual that you know who is similar to you in many 
respects (e.g., roughly the same educational or vo-
cational qualifications, years of experience, skill set, 
TA B L E  2   Effects of social comparisons on mean perceived unfairness and dissatisfaction for Studies 3a, 3b, 5a, and 5b
Social comparison context
tdf [d or dz]
Similar wealth/target worse 
qualifications
Similar wealth/similar 
qualifications
Target better off/similar 
qualifications
Study 3a
Unfair 6.21 (0.73) 2.39 (1.40) – t78.79 = 17.64** [3.43]
Dissatisfaction 5.98 (0.80) 2.36 (1.45) – t81.10 = 15.88** [3.09]
Study 3b
Unfair – 2.47 (1.21) 5.52 (0.94) t103.50 = 14.67** [2.82]
Dissatisfaction – 2.26 (1.14) 5.42 (0.97) t104.87 = 15.49** [2.99]
Study 5a
Unfair 3.75 (1.58) 2.79 (1.45) – t79 = 4.89** [0.55]
Dissatisfaction 3.49 (1.68) 2.93 (1.56) – t79 = 2.64* [0.30]
Study 5b
Unfair – 2.99 (1.23) 3.78 (1.39) t80 = 5.47** [0.61]
Dissatisfaction – 2.94 (1.43) 4.14 (1.41) t80 = 6.65** [0.74]
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Effect sizes are shown in brackets. Degrees of freedom for Studies 3a and 3b are Welch corrected. 
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.001.
F I G U R E  2   Mediation models for Studies 3a and 3b. Values depict 
unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05
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motivation) and who is better off financially than you 
are. Who is the first person that comes to mind?
Like Study 1, participants were given a text box to provide the ini-
tials of their comparison target for each condition, and these initials 
were piped through to the items participants used to rate their per-
ceived unfairness and dissatisfaction: “How unfair or fair do you believe 
your financial situation is compared to [initials]’s financial situation?” 
(−4	=	Extremely unfair to +4 = Extremely fair) and “How dissatisfied or sat-
isfied are you with your financial situation compared to [initials]’s finan-
cial	situation?”	(−4	=	Extremely dissatisfied to +4 = Extremely satisfied). 
Responses were rescaled so that higher values indicate higher perceived 
unfairness and higher dissatisfaction.
Lastly, participants reported their annual income as per Study 1, 
their highest level of educational attainment given four categories 
(did not finish high school, high school graduation, college graduation, 
postgraduate degree;	Kraus,	Adler,	&	Chen,	2013),	and	their	age	and	
gender.
5.2 | Results
5.2.1 | Perceived unfairness
A	3	 (qualifications:	 lower,	 similar,	 higher)	 ×	 3	 (comparative	 finan-
cial situation: worse off, similar, better off) fully within‐subjects 
ANOVA	revealed	significant	main	effects	of	comparative	financial	
situation, F(1.94, 223.27) = 9.47, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.08, and qualifica-
tions of the comparative targets, F(1.94, 223.01) = 7.91, p < 0.001, 
휂
2
p
 = 0.06, on perceived unfairness. There was also a significant 
qualifications × comparative financial situation interaction, F(3.37, 
387.17) = 19.54, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
	=	0.15.	As	shown	in	Figure	3,	the	ef-
fect of comparative affluence on perceived unfairness was weaker 
when the target was better qualified, F(1.84, 211.48) = 2.70, p = 
0.07, 휂2
p
 = 0.02, than similarly qualified, F(1.98, 227.27) = 16.48, 
p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.13, or had lower qualifications, F(1.95, 224.02) = 
25.17, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.18, than the participants. Consistent with 
our Study 3 results, when qualifications were similar, participants 
perceived more unfairness when their chosen target was financially 
better off (M	=	−0.06,	SD = 1.88) than when they had similar finan-
cial circumstances (M	=	−1.21,	SD = 1.84), t(115) = 5.32, p < 0.001, 
dz = 0.49. When comparative affluence was equal, participants 
perceived more unfairness when their chosen target had lower 
qualifications (M = 0.17, SD = 1.93) than the same qualifications 
(M	 =	−1.21,	SD = 1.84), t(115) = 6.06, p < 0.001, dz = 0.56. When 
qualifications were similar, participants perceived more unfair-
ness when their chosen target had a worse (M	=	−0.33,	SD = 1.75) 
vs. the same financial situation (M	 =	 −1.21,	 SD = 1.84), t(115) = 
4.45, p < 0.001, dz = 0.41. When the salaries were equal, partici-
pants perceived more unfairness when their target was better (M 
=	 −0.55,	 SD = 1.69) vs. similarly qualified (M	 =	 −1.21,	 SD = 1.84), 
t(115) = 3.48, p = 0.001, dz = 0.32.
5.2.2 | Dissatisfaction
A	3	(qualifications:	lower,	similar,	higher)	×	3	(comparative	financial	
situation: worse off, similar, better off) fully within‐subjects	ANOVA	
revealed significant main effects of comparative financial situation, 
F(1.92, 220.85) = 76.80, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.40, and qualifications of the 
comparative targets, F(1.96, 224.80) = 3.21, p = 0.043, 휂2
p
 = 0.027, on 
dissatisfaction (see Figure 4).
There was also a significant qualifications × comparative fi-
nancial situation interaction, F(3.78, 434.49) = 7.55, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 
=	0.062.	As	shown	in	Figure	4,	the	effect	of	comparative	salary	on	
dissatisfaction was weaker when the target was better qualified, 
F I G U R E  3   Participants’ mean perceived unfairness after making upward, lateral, and downward comparisons with targets who were 
either better, similarly or worse qualified than the participant in Study 4. ns = not statistically significant. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
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F(2, 229.40) = 24.59, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.176, than similarly qualified, 
F(1.90, 218.44) = 41.29, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.26, or had lower quali-
fications, F(1.99, 229.30) = 48.86, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.30, than the 
participants. Like the effects for perceived unfairness, when qual-
ifications were similar, participants were more dissatisfied when 
their chosen target was financially better (M = 0.76, SD = 1.84) 
vs. similarly off (M	 =	−0.98,	SD = 1.90), t(115) = 7.66, p < 0.001, 
dz = 0.71. When the comparative financial situation was equal, 
participants reported more dissatisfaction when their chosen tar-
get had lower (M = 0.04, SD = 2.01) vs. the same qualifications as 
them (M	=	−0.98,	SD = 1.90), t(115) = 4.63, p < 0.001, dz = 0.43. 
When qualifications were similar, the was no significant differ-
ence in dissatisfaction when the participant’s chosen target was 
financially similar (M	=	−0.98,	SD = 1.90) or worse off (M	=	−0.85,	
SD = 1.79), t(115) = 0.69, p = 0.49, dz = 0.06. When the salaries 
were equal, participants were more dissatisfied when their tar-
get was better (M	=	−0.53,	SD = 1.96) vs. similarly qualified (M = 
−0.98,	SD = 1.90), t(115) = 2.38, p = 0.02, dz = 0.22.
6  | STUDIES 5A AND 5B
In Study 4, the effect of comparative financial status on partici-
pants’ perceptions of unfairness and dissatisfaction depended on 
the	qualifications	of	the	comparative	targets.	Apart	from	a	general	
tendency to report more dissatisfaction when the target was fi-
nancially better off regardless of qualifications, these results are 
largely consistent with those of Study 2 using hypothetical com-
parisons. In Studies 5a and 5b, we again examined the mediating 
role of perceived unfairness in the comparative contexts we used 
in Studies 3a and 3b, but in these studies we asked participants to 
make real rather than hypothetical social comparisons of affluence.
6.1 | Method
6.1.1 | Participants
Participants were recruited to complete an online survey (Study 
5a: N = 80; 49 males; Mage = 32.40, SDage = 9.58; Mincome = $50,628, 
SDincome = $37,480; 53% at least college graduation; Study 5b: N = 81; 
44 males; Mage = 32.99, SDage = 10.96; Mincome = $50,994, SDincome = 
$37,954; 57% at least college graduation). For Study 5b, an addi-
tional 2 participants were excluded due to duplicate IP addresses.
6.1.2 | Procedure and measures
The procedures for both Studies 5a and 5b were similar to Study 
4, except that participants responded to only two types of social 
comparisons. In Study 5a, we fixed the comparative financial situa-
tion between conditions (i.e., the target had similar financial circum-
stances as the participant) but varied within‐subjects whether the 
self‐identified target held the same qualifications or worse qualifica-
tions. In Study 5b, we fixed the target’s qualifications between con-
ditions (i.e., the target had similar qualifications to the participant) 
but varied within‐subjects whether the target was financially better 
off or had similar financial circumstances (“…who is just as well off 
financially as you are”).
After	reporting	the	initials	for	each	comparison	target,	partic-
ipants completed the same measures of perceived unfairness and 
dissatisfaction we used in Studies 3a and 3b (i.e., two items for 
each construct, which were averaged within condition to form 
composite variables of each; rs between items were greater than 
0.50 across conditions and studies). The order of presenting the 
social comparisons was counterbalanced across participants for 
each study.
F I G U R E  4   Participants’ mean perceived dissatisfaction after making upward, lateral, and downward comparisons with targets who were 
either better, similarly or worse qualified than the participant in Study 4. ns = not statistically significant. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
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6.2 | Results
6.2.1 | Study 5a
As	 shown	 in	 Table	 2,	 participants	 reported	 more	 unfairness	 and	
greater dissatisfaction when they compared their financial situation 
with a target who was just as well off financially but had lower quali-
fications than a target who was just as well off financially but had the 
same qualifications.
Following the approach taken in Study 3a, we tested whether per-
ceived unfairness mediated the effect of the social comparison manipu-
lation on dissatisfaction. Given the nested structure of the data (i.e., the 
responses to the comparison targets were nested within participants), 
mediation analyses were performed using hierarchical linear regression 
with the “lme4” (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and “media-
tion”	packages	in	R.	As	shown	in	Figure	5	(upper	panel),	perceived	un-
fairness significantly mediated the effect of comparative qualifications 
on dissatisfaction (indirect effect = 0.87, 95% CI: 0.51, 1.23; p < 0.001).
6.2.2 | Study 5b
As	shown	in	Table	2,	participants	who	compared	themselves	to	an	in-
dividual with similar qualifications but a better financial situation per-
ceived greater unfairness and felt more dissatisfied than participants 
who compared themselves to an individual with similar qualifications 
and	 similar	 income.	As	 shown	 in	Figure	5	 (lower	panel),	 perceived	
unfairness significantly mediated the effect of comparative financial 
situation on dissatisfaction (indirect effect = 0.69, 95% CI: 0.43, 0.96; 
p < 0.001).
7  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
In the present research, we integrated theoretical insights from social 
comparison and equity theories to test the role that perceived simi-
larity of a comparison target plays in the experience of personal rela-
tive deprivation. Study 1 demonstrates that people typically make 
upward comparisons of affluence, and they compare with referent 
others whom they perceive to be more similar than dissimilar along 
dimensions that surround their financial outcomes. In Study 1, how-
ever, participants’ perceived similarity with their chosen comparison 
target did not significantly modulate the relationship between per-
ceived relative disadvantage and resentment. The results of Studies 
2 to 5b point to one reason why: all else being equal, even compari-
sons of affluence with dissimilar others can cause resentment insofar 
as the perceiver deems such comparisons as unfair. Specifically, using 
both hypothetical and real social comparison contexts, we conceptu-
ally replicated previous relative deprivation research (e.g., Callan et 
al., 2008; Kim et al., 2017) by finding that people are generally more 
dissatisfied with their financial situation when their comparative 
targets are financially better off than they are (Studies 2, 3b, 4, and 
5b). But we also found that when the comparative financial contexts 
were similar (i.e., under conditions of wealth equality), participants 
were more dissatisfied when their targets for comparison had lower 
qualifications (Studies 2, 3a, 4, and 5a). In all of these cases, percep-
tions of unfairness mediated the effects of social comparison on 
dissatisfaction (Studies 3a, 3b, 5a, and 5b). Thus, one reason why 
perceived similarity might not have modulated the relation between 
perceived comparative disadvantage and resentment in Study 1 is 
that some participants might have compared with others they per-
ceived to be dissimilar in ways that nonetheless elicited resentment 
(e.g., someone who was equally well off but had worse qualifications; 
cf. Studies 3a and 5a), hence serving to mitigate any potential interac-
tive effect with generally perceived “similarity.”
Taken together, these findings have significant theoretical and ap-
plied implications. Our results support Smith et al.’s (2012; see also 
Crosby, 1976) model of the relative deprivation experience by high-
lighting the key role that perceptions of unfairness play in the link be-
tween adverse social comparisons and resentment with one’s financial 
outcomes. Recently, there has been a great deal of research interest 
into the deleterious effects of income inequality for the individual, 
and our findings confirm that upward social comparisons of one’s 
financial status can affect resentment. These studies, however, also 
serve to bolster the point that the perception that one is not getting 
what one deserves relative to others is a key determinant of resent-
ment and dissatisfaction rather than the inequality of outcomes per 
se, because even comparisons under conditions of “income equality” 
can lead to resentment if people perceive equal financial outcomes as 
unfair. Thus, from a distributive justice perspective, comparisons with 
others who are similarly well off but who are not perceived to merit 
their equal standing could lead to the same negative outcomes for the 
individual that have been shown to be associated with resentment 
stemming from comparisons with referent others who are financially 
better off (e.g., ill‐health, materialism, interpersonal aggression).
From a research methods standpoint, the current studies also 
contribute to the literature by developing and validating relatively 
F I G U R E  5   Mediation models for Studies 5a and 5b. Values depict 
unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05
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straightforward, adaptable, and easily administered manipulations of 
personal relative deprivation. Researchers interested in examining the 
consequences of personal relative deprivation have largely employed 
correlational, cross‐sectional designs (e.g., Beshai et al., 2017; Callan 
et al., 2015). The manipulations we developed here could be used in 
further applied research to provide supporting causal evidence for 
these and other potential consequences of personal relative depri-
vation. For example, Callan et al. (2017) found that self‐reported per-
sonal relative deprivation was negatively associated with prosociality, 
but causal evidence for this link is lacking. Indeed, personal relative 
deprivation could lead people to be less generous to others as Callan 
et al. (2017) proposed, but being generous to others (e.g., by donat-
ing money to charity) could also lead to personal relative deprivation 
insofar as expending resources in this way affects one’s relative finan-
cial position. Using the manipulations we developed here, future re-
searchers could examine how invidious social comparisons within the 
workplace, for example, might reduce people’s willingness to engage 
in organizational citizenship behaviors (for a review, see LePine, Erez, 
& Johnson, 2002), such as whether a person might be less prosocial 
toward a work colleague (e.g., willingness to cover their shift) in the 
conditions we found to elicit a sense of unfairness and dissatisfaction.
Limitations of the current studies should also be considered in 
future research. First, we focused on contexts where equity and 
equality were particularly relevant to people’s experiences of per-
sonal relative deprivation (e.g., varying qualifications in the work-
place), but these are not the only principles people use to evaluate 
the fairness or unfairness of the allocations of outcomes. Indeed, in 
some situations people rely on need rather than equity or equality 
as a basis for deciding the fairness of outcomes, such as in familial 
relationships (Deutsch, 1975; Lerner, 1975). The degree to which the 
results of these studies apply in situations where concerns about 
the needs of a comparative target are salient remains to be inves-
tigated.	 Second,	we	 relied	 on	 samples	 from	Amazon’s	Mechanical	
Turk.	 Although	 MTurk	 participants	 are	 more	 demographically	 di-
verse than traditional undergraduate psychology student samples, 
Paolacci and Chandler (2014) noted that they are not representative 
of the general population and might not always be fully attentive. 
We limited the latter concern by removing participants who were 
clearly	not	attending	to	the	materials.	Nonetheless,	future	research	
should consider extending our findings using samples that are more 
representative.
Finally, across studies we asked participants to select and re-
spond to one‐off, individual social comparisons. In daily life, however, 
social comparisons often occur in dynamic, ongoing social relation-
ships with multiple targets at once. Moreover, social norms that limit 
discussing one’s finances with others, or pay secrecy policies in the 
workplace (Rosenfeld, 2017), may affect how much people can be 
aware of their relative financial status in the first place. We also fo-
cused on upward social comparison contexts that tended to elicit re-
sentment, but not all upward social comparisons necessarily lead to 
negative affect—sometimes upward comparisons may elicit positive 
feelings through upward assimilation (i.e., feeling positive because 
one may improve to become more like their better off target; see 
Buunk & Ybema, 1997). Thus, although we found consistent evidence 
that one‐off adverse social comparisons can produce a sense of un-
fairness and resentment, we know little about how the processes we 
examined in the current research might play out over repeated en-
counters with multiple social comparison targets (see Gartrell, 2002).
8  | CONCLUSIONS
The goal of the current research was to examine several issues re-
lated to the role of perceived similarity in the experience of personal 
relative deprivation. We found that people tend to make social com-
parisons of affluence with targets they perceive to be more similar 
than dissimilar along dimensions and attributes that surround their 
financial status, and they typically select targets for comparison who 
are financially better off. We also addressed some of the ambiguities 
around what it means to be “similar” or “dissimilar” to a compari-
son target in the context of making social comparisons of affluence. 
There is not a straightforward link between perceived similarity of a 
comparison target and personal relative deprivation, because being 
both similar and dissimilar to a target (vis‐à‐vis background qualifica-
tions or “inputs”) can cause resentment depending on whether the 
person perceives the comparative context as unfair.
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